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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Hypnotic phenomena have long fascinated and puzzled 
observers. The two most remarkable aspects of hypnotism 
have been the involuntary character of the hypnotized per-
son's behavior, and the extraordinary manifestations of 
such behavior. 
As for the first aspect, observers have been struck 
by the way the hypnotized person follows the instructions, 
or the suggestions, of the hypnotist. The response is not 
necessarily reflexive; it rather appears to be a reaction 
to an irresistible force. This is most noticeable in post-
hypnotic compliance with suggestions given during the 
trance. The hypnotized person reports that he experiences 
the most insistent urge to perform a certain act which is 
frequently irrelevant to the waking circumstances. The 
somewhat awesome feature of the post-hypnotic behavior is 
that the hypnotized person is unaware of the origin of the 
urge, and he will often attempt to rationalize his act. 
This feature has given rise to an unresolved controversy 
2 
over the question whether a hypnotized person can be 
forced to commit anti-social acts without felonious intent. 
The hypnotized person's rationalizing of an implanted urge 
first alerted Freud to the importance of unconscious motiva-
tion. 
As for the strange phenomena produced by the hypno-
tized person, it has been stated that a person in trance 
can exceed the usual limits of his performance. For ex-
ample, he can keep his hand in a rigid position much longer 
than would be possible in his normal state; he can show 
remarkable insensitivity to pain, and he can recall recent 
and remote events which are not available to him when he 
is awake. 
Perhaps the claim for better memory, or hypermnesia, 
has most contributed to the trend to use hypnosis in some 
cases of psychotherapy, mainly to facilitate the evocation 
of repressed events. 
In recent years some doubt has been cast on the 
validity of both the involuntary nature of hypnotic phenom-
ena and their extraordinary characteristics. Writers like 
White (1941) and Sarbin (1950) have stated that since sub• 
- ~ - -j ects are motivated to comply with the wishes of the 
hypnotist, the behavior produced is not involuntary. 
Empirical studies, based on such a theoretical stand~ for 
3 
example, Orne (1959) and Rosenberg (1960), have shown that 
- - -
with proper motivation subjects who are not susceptible to 
hypnosis are able to produce most of the hypnotic phenomena. 
However, a notable exception has been reported by Orne: 
the hypnotized persons show readiness to accept perceptual 
inconsistencies without an attempt to resolve them by any 
rationalization. The unsusceptible subjects, on the other 
band, show marked uneasiness and report difficulty in 
handling such inconsistencies. 
The present study aims to explore further the be-
havior of hypnotized persons exposed to inconsistencies. 
The investigation is concerned with the reaction of hyp-
notized subjects to cognitive rather than perceptual in-
consistencies, and is centered on the recall activity of 
such subjects when they are presented with verbal material 
arranged in a manner which is inconsistent with their 
previous syntactical knowledge. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF 'l1iE PROBLEM 
Three areas of study bear on the present research: 
(l) the hypnotic state, (2) cognitive dissonance, and 
-(3) retention. 
l. 'l'be Hypnotic State 
A person is deemed to be in the hypnotic state when 
be can produce, in response to suggestions of the hypnotist 
at least some of several phenomena. The following are the 
most often quoted hypnotic phenomena: sensory desensitiza-
tion--anesthesia and analgesia; motor rigidity, such as arm 
catalepsy and eyelid rigidity; positive hallucinations, 
such as bearing the buzz of an imaginary fly, and negative 
hallucinations, not seeing a present object; memory hyper-
functioning, the ability to regress to an earlier age, to 
recall remote events, and to follow post-hypnotic sugges-
tions; and memory bypofunctioning, such as amnesia for 
events occurring in the hypnotic state. 
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Since it bas been found tbetsubjects who are 
unsusceptible to hypnosis have been able to produce most 
of the hypnotic phenomena, the authenticity of such be-
havior can no longer be assumed without further inquiry. 
Usually the subject's assertion that he bas not simulated 
and that he really experienced his behavior as involuntary 
is taken as evidence that the phenomena produced are truly 
hypnotic. Sometimes the subject has been requested to 
sign a statement to the effect that he is not simulating 
(Pattie, 1935). 
' 
Besides the eliciting and the categorizing of 
hypnotic phenomena, various attempts have been made to ac-
count for the different aspects of these behaviors. One 
may group these explanatory attempts under two broad 
categories: (A) motivational explanations, and (B) cog-
nitive explanations. Several writers have dealt with both 
explanatory concepts. 
A. Motivational Explanations 
Common to such positions is the postulation of a 
need to follow the instructions of the hypnotist. 
White (1941) defines hypnotic behavior as "mean-
ingful, goal-directed striving, its mos~ general goal being 
to behave like a hypnotized person, as this is continuously 
defined by the operator and understood by the subject." 
(p. 503). 
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The contribution of this view is that it suggests 
that the subject is not a passive tool in the hands of the 
operator, but a motivated participant. The shortcoming of 
such a conception seems to be that it does not fully 
indicate what makes the subject strive to behave like a 
hypnotized person. It is suggested that the subject's 
"regnant motive is submission to the operator's demands 
• • • " (p. 503), but the reasons for submission are not 
dealt with. 
This problem is taken into prominent consideration 
in the psychoanalytic formulations about hypnosis. 
Freud (1905) believed that "the essence of hypnosis 
lies in an unconscious fixation of the subject's libido to 
the figure of the hypnotist through the medium of the 
masochistic components of the sexual instinct." (p. 150). 
- -
Ferenczi (1909) perceived the hypnotic relationship 
as a reactivation of the Oedipus Complex. He made a dis-
tinction between "maternal" and "paternal" forms of hyp-
nosis. "Maternal" hypnosis is an evocation of love ties, 
while "paternal" hypnosis is based on fear. 
Freud (1922) compared hypnosis with being in love, 
but to the exclusion of sexual satisfaction. He noted 
another aspect of hypnosis as the hypnotist awaking "the 
idea of a paramount and dangerous person, towards whom 
only a passive~ochistic attitude is possible and to 
whom one's will has to be surrendered." (p. 127). 
- -
Schilder and Kauders (1927) added an emphasis on 
- -
the role of identification with the hypnotist. The sub-
ject "projects his desire on the hypnotist and subse-
quently, by identification, attains magic powers which he 
would not otherwise be permitted to ascribe to himself." 
(p. 94). 
Kubie and Margolin (1944) tend to minimize in 
- -
their conclusions the importance of transference in hyp-
nosis. They state: 
In the hypnotic process, mechanisms are at work 
identical with those seen in the dream (such as 
transference, displacement, condensation, etc.) 
Much has been made of these in the literature,- but 
they are not the essence either of the process or 
of the state itself. (p. 621). 
- -
However, they describe certain changes that occur 
7 
in the subject that appear to have "transference" qualities. 
So they draw a parallel between the induction phase and 
the earliest phase of infancy, "during which the parents 
play in the psychology of the infant a role almost 
identical to the hypnotist in the mental life of the sub-
ject ••• " (p. 620). Further on they say: 
8 
The final phase in the hypnotic process • • • 
parallels precisely that phase in the development 
of the infant's Ego in which its boundaries gradu-
ally expand • • • The incorporated image of the 
hypnotist plays the same role in the hypnotic sub-ject as does the incorporated and unconscious ~e 
of the parental figure in the child or adult. (p. 621). 
- -
Gill and Brenman (1959) consider the inter-personal 
- -
relationship to be of major importance in hypnosis. How-
ever, they make a distinction between transference under-
lying the hypnotic state and transference in therapy: 
We are suggesting that the onstoinst and developing 
transference is fluid and shifting, speclflcaiiy 
related to the interaction between patient and thera-
post, while the h;rnotic state may be more like a 
fixed structure,thout specificity to the therapist 
and the therapeutic situation. (p. 137) • 
. 
They perceive the transference relationship in 
hypnosis as taking place between the hypnotist and a re-
gressed part of the ego, a subsystem with specific 
qualities resulting from the regressive trend. This point 
will be elaborated below when the cognitive aspects of 
hypnosis are dealt with. 
B. Cognitive Explanations 
Most writers who focus on cognitive explanations 
propose that at least a partial suspension of some cog-
nitive functions takes place in the hypnotic state. 
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Tbe lethargic behavior of many hypnotized persons 
led early to the notion that hypnosis was a form of sleep. 
In 1784 the Marquis de Puysegur (see Pattie, 1956) coined 
• 
- -
the term 11 somnambulistic sleep" to describe the hypnotic 
state. Braid's term "neurohypnotism" was derived from the 
same conception, although he changed his mind later 
(Bramwell, 1930). A neurological basis for such a con-
. 
ception was provided by Pavlov (1923). He extrapolated to 
. 
the hypnotic state in man from the behavior of dogs sub-
jected to repetitive presentation of conditioned stimuli. 
He proposed that part of the brain most directly affected 
by the conditioned stimulus became the center of an in-
hibitory process which radiated to other parts of the 
brain. Tbe stages of inhibition prior to sleep were 
called hypnosis, which was conceived of as partial sleep. 
"Inhibition is partial sleep or sleep distributed in 
localized parts, forced into narrow limits ••• " (p. 607). 
-
Tbe controversy over the relation between hypnosis 
and sleep has not yet been settled (see, for example, 
. 
Gill and Brenman, 1959). However, the idea of "sleep dis-
tributed in localized parts," divorced from neurological 
locus, points to the suspension of certain functions of 
the waking state, including cognition. 
10 
Hull (1933) proposed that in the hypnotic state 
- -
the symbolic functions of the hypnotized person are with-
drawn, or suspended, and the suggestions of the hypnotist 
replace such functions in the subject's ideomotor con-
tinuum. In other words, the ideas of the hypnotist activ-
ate the muscles of the subject as conditioned stimuli, 
instead of the subject's own ideas. Here, again, the core 
of the explanation is that cognitive functions of the 
hypnotized person are being suspended during the trance. 
The dissociation theory, as expounded by Janet 
(1920) and McDougall (1926), appears to consist of two 
-
parts. One component is in psychological terms and the 
other is a neurological interpretation. The following 
quotation from McDougall may serve to illustrate the two 
components: 
The patient will fail to achieve a forbidden 
movement ••• because, when he tries to make a move-
ment and succeeds in innervating the proper muscles, 
the antagonistic muscles come into play and prevent 
the movement. At this stage, then, there is mani-
fested a certain splitting of the personality, a 
conflict of one part against the other: the muscles 
of one set obey the conscious willing subject; the 
antagonistic muscles obey some other part of the 
personality, which understands and is subservient 
to the comments and suggestions of the operator. (p. 87). 
-The neurological explanation has been criticized by 
White and Shevach (1942). Their major point is that while 
ll 
there may be neurplogical sense in total suspension of one 
function, for example, bearing, there cannot be a neurolog-
ical basis for selective dysfunctioning, for example, bear-
ing only the hypnotist's words and being deaf to all other 
sounds. 
The psychological component of the dissociation 
theory bas not been dealt with by these critics. This 
component implies that there is some functional splitting 
of the personality, one part of which is the conscious sub-
ject, and the other, that which obeys the hypnotist. Such 
possible restructuring of the personality, although in dif-
ferent terms, will be encountered later in this section in 
connection with Gill and Brenman1 s approach to hypnotism. 
It may be pointed out here that an important part of such 
reorganization involves cognitive elements. 
The three writers whose opinions are discussed 
next differ somewhat from those who preceded and those who 
will follow in that they focus more on the intensification 
of some cognitive functions rather than on the suspension 
of some other functions. 
Sarbin (1950) views hypnosis as one form of role-
taking. According to Sarbin, role-taking, whether in act-
ing, in hypnosis, in hysterias or in states of ecstasy, 
involves an aptitude for losing oneself in the role and 
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becoming relatively unaware of the environment. It appears 
that the relative unawareness is not a result of the hypno-
tist's manipulations, but of concentrating on the self and 
on the role to be enacted. 
Arnold (1946) proposes that the effects of hypnosis 
-
are due to imagination. Tbe subject tries to imagine 
vividly the situation described by the hypnotist and to 
imagine himself in it. 
Barber (1960) regards the "hypnotic aptitude" as 
one of the necessary conditions for hypnotic behavior. 
Tbis aptitude, active not only in the hypnotic trance, is 
defined as the ability to become and remain selectively 
attentive and responsive to certain stimuli. 
In a sense, the three writers state that the 
hypnotic behavior is task-oriented, and they postulate 
certain abilities: concentration, selective attention, 
and imagination, to account for the performance of good 
hypnotic subjects. Tbey do not attempt to deal with other 
possible cognitive changes that may occur in the hypnotic 
state. 
A more systematic effort in this direction is made 
by Gill and Brenman (1959) within the framework of psycho-
analytic theory of hypnosis. Tbeir discussion offers an 
overall view of changes that occur in hypnosis, but the 
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present exposition of their views will be focussed on the 
cognitive aspects. 
The authors propose that in hypnosis there exists 
an "intra-ego" structure, a subsystem that selectively rep-
resents the total personality. This subsystem is the part 
which regresses during hypnosis, while the overall ego ap-
pears to remain intact. The regressive changes in the sub-
system involve: 
(1) shift to more primitive defensive mechanisms; 
(2) greater preponderance of discharge by affect pro-
cesses as against intellectual processes; (3) movement 
from action to less adaptive discharge patterns; (4) movement toward dedifferentiation. (p. 207). 
- -
In more general terms, the authors say that "the 
dynamics of a regressed mental state show a movement toward 
primary process functioning and away from secondary process 
functioning." (p. 206). 
-Gill and Bremnan state: 
The dynamic relationship between the over-all ego 
and the intra-ego subsystem may be one of conflict or 
cooperation. If the conflict is of any severity, the 
over-all e2o re-establishes its hegemonG and the hyP-
nosis Is Interrupted. XE the relations ip is one of 
cooperation, the hypnosis persists and the over-all 
ego may progressively "lend" its functions to the 
subsystem for automatized functioning under the aegis 
of the subsystem. (pp. 207-208). (Italics not in 
original). 
It appears that during hypnosis there is a certain 
relinquisliling of hegemony, or suspension of activity of the 
14 
over-all ego together with some readiness to take over in 
certain circumstances. 
Gill and Bremnan discuss the hypnotic state from the 
structural, the dynamic, the adaptive, the genetic and the 
economic points of view. Relevant here is the main thesis 
that in the hypnotic state there is a relative abeyance of 
reality-oriented functioning and an increase in more prim-
itive modes of dealing with the enviromnent. 
A similar stand is taken by Shor (1959) who con-
centrates only on the cognitive aspects of the hypnotic 
state. He uses the term "generalized reality-orientation" 
which is defined as, "A structured frame of reference in 
the background of attention, which supports, interprets, 
and gives meaning to all experiences." (p. 585) • 
-
He proposes that in hypnosis two fundamental 
processes take place: "The first is the construction of a 
special temporary orientation to a small range of pre-
occupation and the second is the relative fading of the gen-
eralized reality-orientation into nonfunctional unawareness." 
(p. 594). When such fading occurs, "primary modes of 
thought may flow into the background of awareness to orient 
experiences." (p. 597). 'J.'he "temporary orientation to a 
small range of preoccupation" may be compared to Gill and 
Bremnan' s "intra-ego structure, • and the "relative fading 
15 
of the generalized reality-orientation" to the relinquishing 
of hegemony of the over-all ego. 
For clarity of exposition in this review of the 
literature a distinction has been made between the con-
ceptions that deal with the motivational aspects of hyp-
nosis and those that deal with the cognitive aspects. 
Most writers have considered both, although usually with 
relative emphasis on one. As for the motivational aspects, 
it has in essence been stated that the hypnotized person 
participates actively in the hypnotic transaction because 
it fulfills certain of his needs. As for the cognitive 
aspects, the common core of the argument is that in the 
hypnotic state there is a relative suspension of the 
normal cognitive functioning with possible activation of 
other modes of thought. 
Two studies that bear on the cognitive aspects of 
hypnosis are relevant here. 
Aclanan (1960) has hypothesized on the basis of 
- -
Gill and Brenman's propositions that subjects under 
hypnosis will produce Rorschach percepts of a more primi-
tive nature than when they are in their normal state. 
Using categories devised by Holt (1960) in the content 
' -
analysis of the Rorschach protocols, Aclanan bas confirmed 
her hypothesis. Subjects produce significantly more 
16 
"level I" (more primary and archaic) percepts under hyp-
" -
no sis than they do when they are awake. 
Orne (1959) has found that hypnotic subjects are 
" -
not troubled by perceptual contradictions. They may 
simultaneously hallucinate a person in one part of a room 
and perceive him situated in another part of that room, 
without regarding this as an impossibility that needs 
justification. Orne considers such a reaction to be an 
instance of "trance-logic," where contradictions are ac-
cepted without an attempt to resolve them. He points out 
the similarity between this kind of logic and primary 
process thinking. 
2. Cognitive Dissonance 
Making sense of phenomena is a major attribute of 
thinking, whether of the commons.ense variety or of the 
more refined logical and scientific kind. Making sense 
involves the ordering or categorizing of observations, and 
an important aspect of the categorizing process is its con-
sistency. Ordering would be meaningless if its criteria 
were changed from item to item. When man is exposed to 
inconsistencies he attempts to deal with them in such a 
way that consistency will result. 
The problem of cognitive inconsistency and its 
resolution has mainly interested investigators in social 
psychology, and more specifically, in the field of atti-
tude change. They have used various terms to describe 
inconsistencies. Heider (1958) names the continuum 
- -
"imbalance-balance," and Osgood (1960) calls it 
"incongruity-congruity." 
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The most methodical attempt to deal with the prob-
lem has been made by Festinger (1957) who prefers the term 
"cognitive dissonance" for inconsistency, and "cognitive 
consonance" for consistency. Cognitive dissonance is con-
ceptualized by Festinger as a motivating state similar to 
the hunger drive, but without physiological origins. It 
may be defined as an awareness of dissonant relations 
between elements of cognition. An element of cognition 
may be a piece of knowledge, a belief, or an attitude 
about oneself or the enviromnent. The author defines 
dissonant relations between two elements of cognition as 
obtaining when the obverse of one element will follow from 
the other. Or in symbols, x and y are dissonant if not-x 
follow from y. It should be stressed again that obverse 
relations are much more inclusive than contradiction, which 
is a particular instance of obverse relations. So, for 
example, "not-black" may be any color and not necessarily 
"white." Festinger himself uses in his examples mostly 
the case of contradiction. 
He formulates two hypotheses that he regards as 
basic to his theory: 
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1. The existence of dissonance, being psycholog-
ically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try 
to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance. 
2. When dissonance is present, in addition to 
trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid 
situations and informations which would likely in-
crease the dissonance. 
The empirical evidence by which Festinger and his 
followers support these hypotheses comes mainly from 
studies of attitude change, which are not relevant to the 
present research. However, a study by Rosenberg (1960 a) 
may serve to illustrate a corroboration of one of 
Festinger's hypotheses. Rosenberg (1960 b) sumnarizes the 
study as follows: 
Eleven experimental and eleven control subjects 
were tested on two separate occasions for their 
affective and cognitive responses toward various 
attitude objects. Between the two testing sessions 
the experimental subjects (all of whom were capable 
of achieving deep hypnosis) were placed in hypnosis 
and then given the suggestion that upon awaking 
their affective reactions toward two separate atti-
tude objects would be changed (from positive to 
negative, or vice versa) and that they would have 
no memory of the suggestion's having been made until 
the presentation of an amnesia-removing signal. It 
was assumed that such posthypnotic suggestion would 
foster strong and "irreversible" affect change :llor 
as long as posthypnotic amnesia was maintained. In a 
control ~roup which received no affect manipulation 
the cognitive responses toward attitude objects re-
mained stable from the first to the second test 
19 
administrations. In the experimental group signifi-
cant change occurred not only in the subjects' af-
fects toward the attitude obi"ects but also in their 
beliefs about the relationsh ps between each of those 
objects and various "values" deemed important by the 
subjects. (pp. 325-326). 
-
The results of this study appear to confirm 
Festinger's first hypothesis about the reduction of dis-
sonance and the achievement of consonance. 
3. Retention 
There are three main theories that attempt to ac-
count for the phenomena of forgetting: 
1. The interference theory. This theory is based 
mainly on measured evidence of retroactive inhibition. It 
depends essentially on the idea that newer responses to 
stimuli compete successfully with other responses to the 
same stimuli, with resulting non-evocation of the older 
responses. 
2. The trace theory. This theory is principally 
expounded by Gestalt theorists, such as Koffka (1935). 
-They assert basically that perceptual experiences leave 
traces in the brain field. Since these traces are within 
a system of forces, they are affected by other traces and 
by the influx of new perceptual activity. The traces also 
undergo autonomous changes according to Gestalt laws 
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identical with those that operate in perception. These 
changes produce the loss of some of the material of the 
original experience. So, for example, a distorted circle 
will be recalled as a good circle because such is the 
final trace of the original percept. Sharpening and level-
ing are examples of the results of the operation of gestalt 
principles. 
3. The psychoanalytic theory of repression explains 
forgetting in terms of ego forces or defenses that prevent 
the emergence into awareness of elements unacceptable to 
the ego. 
Bartlett (1932) offers an explanation that in a 
- -
sense combines organizing elements from Gestalt theory and 
affective components from psychoanalysis. The essence of 
his view is that the core of memory is an emotional atti-
tude, which, at the time of reproduction, serves to 
organize that which is recalled. This emotional organiz-
ing attitude is termed a "schema." Memory is not a 
passive reproduction of perceptions, but an active recon-
struction. 
In that part of his experimental work which is 
relevant to the present research, Bartlett has shown that 
in reproducing meaningful connected verbal material, there 
is a strong tendency to make sense of unconnected or 
21 
unfamiliar elements by rationalizing them. The individual 
distorts them by the addition of explanatory ties or by 
changing the details to make them more consistent with his 
cultural background. Another process that takes place is 
the forgetting of the unfamiliar and ambiguous elements. 
Levine and Murphy (1943) have shown that material 
which is inconsistent with the subject• s view is learned 
with more difficulty. Subjects who had procOIIIDUilist views 
learned more slowly than subjects with an anticOIIIDUilist out-
look a passage that was critical of the Soviet Union. The 
opposite occurred with a passage reflecting views favorable 
to the Russians. The rate of forgetting of the two pas-
sages was rather similar for the two groups. but in a way 
the slowness of learning already involves forgetting 
trends. 
Allport and Postman (1948) • in their study of 
serial verbal reproduction of scenes, discuss the effects 
of sharpening and leveling within the context of assimila-
tion, which is quite similar to the idea of consistency 
with past experiences. 
Besides mentioning the ~or theoretical attempts 
to account for forgetting in general, several studies have 
been cited in this section that show the vulnerability to 
forgetting of material which is at variance with the 
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attitudes and knowledge at the disposal of the subjects. 
The influence of hypnosis on the recall of such variant 
material will be discussed in the following chapters. The 
hypnotic impact on the recall of regular verbal material 
is considered in the next section. 
Retention under Hypnosis 
Bartlett's views on remembering serve as the 
theoretical basis for two studies that deal, in part, with 
the retention of meaningful, connected material under 
hypnosis. White, Fox, and Harris (1940) had their subjects 
learn some stanzas of a poem to a criterion of one perfect 
repetition. Recall, which took place twenty-four hours 
later, was 53.1 per cent better in hypnosis than under 
normal conditions. Rosenthal (1944) also found hypermnesia 
under hypnosis for recall of poetry learned in waking. 
The authors of these two studies propose that 
hypnosis brings about relaxation, freedom from anxiety and 
lack of ego involvement, and therefore the creative recon-
struction of memory, as suggested by Bartlett, proceeds 
more smoothly and less strenuously than in the usual waking 
state. 
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4. SUIIIDary of the Review of the Literature 
Three areas of study that bear on the present re-
search have been reviewed. In discussing the literature 
on the hypnotic state, consensus has been noted in con-
sidering the hypnotized person as a motivated participant 
in an intense inter-personal relationship. As for cog-
nitive aspects of the hypnotic state, which are of major 
concem for the present study, most writers concur in the 
view that at least a partial suspension of rational cog-
nitive functioning takes place under hypnosis. 
The problem of cognitive dissonance has been re-
viewed next. It has been suggested that information which 
is contrary to expectation based on previous experience 
and which cannot be meaningfully integrated with such ex-
perience, is coped with either by being ignored or by 
being changed so as to fit present knowledge. 
In reviewing the problem of retention, the major 
theoretical explanations have been mentioned, the recall 
fate of dissonant material has been discussed, and the 
studies on recall under hypnosis of verbal material have 
been SUIIIIIarized. 
In the following theoretical discussion the three 
areas reviewed will be related to each other in accordance 
with the focus of this research. 
CHAPTER III 
'l'HEORETICAL FORMUlATIONS 
It is not surprising that most theoretical ap-
proaches to the problem of thinking have in common the 
belief that cognitive processes operate according to 
certain rules, laws, or principles. So, the Association-
ists state the laws of similarity, contrast, and con-
tiguity (see for example, Boring, 1929); the "thought 
-
psychologists" restate rules of formal logic in terms of 
"consciousness" (see, for example, the discussion and 
~ 
critique by Piaget, 1947); the Gestalt theorists offer 
-laws of organization involving such rules as simplicity, 
regularity, proximity, syumetry, and pragnanz (see, for 
-
example, Koffka, 1935); Piaget (1947) discusses the "group-
- - . 
ing operations" of intelligence and he states rules or 
conditions, for such operations, like combinativity, asso-
ciativity, and especially, reversibility; Bartlett (1958) 
- -
asserts that the possibility of a series of inter-connected 
steps between the beginning and the end of a thinking 
process "confer upon all thinking a character of necessity, 
or compulsion" (p. 75); Bruner (1957) proposes that 
certain formal schemata are the rules for the "coding," 
or categorizing, operations of the cognitive processes. 
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It is easily noted that but for consensus about 
the existence of such rules governing cognitive processes, 
there is little agreement about the type of rules that 
regulate them. Similarly, there is little agreement among 
the theorists about the emergence of the rules of thought. 
So, the Associationists consider previous experience to be 
essential for the establishment of association laws; learn-
ing is suggested by Bruner as the origin of the formal 
schemata that underlie "coding, 11 and to some extent this 
is Bartlett's belief too; the "thought psychologists" fall 
back on logical apriorism, i.e. non-psychological invari-
ance; the Gestalt basic assertion of isomorphism of brain 
fields and the environment states invariance of a struc-
tural nature; Piaget views intellectual abstractive opera-
tions as evolving from earlier and more primitive forms, 
and the whole series is regarded as steps in biological 
adaptation; with less elaboration Bartlett offers a simi-
lar conception. 
It is not necessary here to get involved in the 
controversy over the type of rules that govern thought or 
their origin. It may however be stated that evolutional 
explanations appear to offer greater flexibility to 
cognitive principles than aprioristic or physiological 
standpoints of invariance. 
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Most theorists find it convenient to begin the dis-
cussion about cognitive processes from an arbitrary start-
ing point which is the encounter with new information. 
Under optimal conditions of alertness, the cognitive pro-
cesses of the adult (adulthood is chosen here to avoid 
-genetic considerations) may fully operate according to the 
-
rules offered above. Thus the new item may be compared 
to other items in order to be associated to those that are 
similar to it (according to associationistic laws); it may 
- -be embedded within a certain configuration (in line with 
-Gestalt rules); it may be consciously felt to be logically 
-
related (in "thought psychology'' terms); or it may be 
- -
serialized, classified "coded" or "grouped" in line with 
the suggestions of Bartlett, Bruner, and Piaget. 
The nature of many new items of knowledge is such 
that their integration or assimilation within the context 
of existing experience is achieved with relatively minor 
cognitive effort. This is usually the case when the new 
information is consistent with previous experience, or 
rather with this segment of previous experience which is 
relevant to the new element. The appearance of a red 
signal with a car coming to a full stop in front of it is 
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consistent with previous knowledge of the relevant rule of 
the road. 
However, not all new items of information are 
integrated according to one rule or another with existing 
cognitions. One obvious reason for the difficulty of 
integration may have to do with the state of the person. 
Fatigue, or lack of interest and motivation may interfere 
with the optimal operation of the cognitive processes. 
Another reason may be the circumstances under which the 
cognitive process operates. For example, if not enough 
time is allotted for the operation, the new item may not 
be assimilated. 
However, the absence of integration may be due to 
the nature of the new cognitive element; it may be incon-
sistent with previous experience. The appearance of a 
green signal coupled with the abrupt stopping of several 
cars in front of it, without another relevant reason, may 
illustrate such inconsistency with previous knowledge. 
Such inconsistency arouses some kind of "conflict of 
forces" and the resolution of such conflict depends on the 
strength of the competing forces. If the illustration of 
inconsistency is extended and it is said that the person 
is exposed to it after several years of being out in the 
wilderness, he may decide that the relevant previous 
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knowledge is no longer valid. In another instance the 
person may be in a strange town and he may decide that the 
rules known to him are reversed for this particular town. 
Tbe resolution here is achieved by relying on another seg-
ment of previous knowledge--11rules may have exceptions •11 
The invalidation of previous experience or the 
incorporation of an inconsistent item within a broader or 
a different context depend upon the importance of the item. 
Some parameters of "importance" may be the intensity of 
the stimulus (in such terms as frequency and duration), 
- -
the degree of dissonance or divergence from what is usu-
ally expected or anticipated on the basis of previous 
experience, and the affective intensity of the new item. 
When the new item is not intense enought to over-
ride existing knowledge, and on the other hand it is dis-
crepant to the degree that it cannot be incorporated 
within any context of previous experience, it is handled 
in one of two ways. These ways may be described in 
propositions based on Festinger's hypotheses, with some 
revision and reversed order: 
l. When a new item of information is dissonant 
(inconsistent) with present knowledge to the extent it can-
- -
not be assimilated to it, it may be ignored, or avoided. 
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2. The dissonant item may be changed, or distorted, 
so as to fit existing cognitions. 
It appears that corresponding processes take place 
in memory phenomena: parallel to avoidance in the present 
there is forgetting of material presented in the past. 
Thus Bartlett (1932) has found that incongruous and unfamil-
iar material is forgotten more than congruous material. 
Similarly, distortion can take place, and the recall of 
inconsistent material is shown by Bartlett to be distorted 
more to fit expectations than is regular material. For-
getting and distortion of dissonant material has also been 
found by Paul (1959) using Bartlett's methods, and similar 
results have been obtained by Levine and Murphy (1943) and 
Allport and Postman (1948). 
The discussion about the fate of dissonant items 
of cognition that are not integrated with existing knowl-
edge can be recapitulated in the following way: If along 
a temporal continuum wherein cognitive processes operate 
two points are chosen, a point of exposure of material, 
and a point of recall, then a dissonant element may be 
avoided at the point of exposure, by not being "registered," 
or it may be avoided at a later point, at recall, by not 
being remembered. At both points this dissonant item may 
be distorted. 
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What can be predicted about the hypnotic influence 
on the fate of such dissonant elements? 
It has been pointed out in the review of the liter-
ature about the cognitive aspects of hypnosis that most 
writers propose a partial suspension of rational, reality-
oriented processes in the hypnotic state. Thus Gill and 
Brenman (1959) suggest on the basis of clinical observa-
- -
tiona that the over-all ego surrenders part of its hegemony 
to the regressed intra-ego structure, and Shor (1960) 
speaks about the non-functioning of the "generalized 
reality-orientation." Ackman (1960) has found experi-
- -
mentally that hypnotized subjects tend to produce more 
"primary'' type of percepts, and Orne (1959) has observed 
- -
that hypnotized persons view with equanimity perceptual 
inconsistencies. 
On the basis of these statements and findings 
about partial suspension of everyday cognitive processes 
under hypnosis, it is proposed that hypnosis reduces the 
amount of avoiding, forgetting and distorting of dissonant 
material. The reduction occurs because the dissonant 
element is not "judged" by the partially suspended ra-
tional processes to be "dissonant." Now, in line with the 
recapitulation offered above, two possibilities are con-
ceivable: (l) if partial suspension of the cognitive 
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processes occurs at the first point of the temporal con-
tinuum, i.e. at exposure point of the dissonant material, 
this material is going to be "registered," and so it will 
be available for recall at a later temporal point; (2) it 
is still likely that the process of avoiding and/or dis-
torting is not immediately operating; therefore, partial 
suspension of the cognitive processes at the point of re-
call will still allow the dissonant material to be 
"registered" and reproduced. On the basis of the two con-
ceivable possibilities, two specific predictions are made: 
1. The recall of dissonant material is increased 
when the initial exposure is made under hypnosis. 
2. The recall of dissonant material exposed in the 
normal state is increased if recalling is under hypnosis. 
The purpose of this research is to test these two 
predictions. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
1. Subjects 
The subjects were sixteen undergraduate students, 
nine females and seven males, in the age range from 22 to 
27, with the median at 23. They were made available by 
the "Studies in Hypnosis Project" at the Massachusetts 
Mental Health Center, having previously been classified as 
very good hypnotic subjects. Each had undergone one group 
screening and two individual screenings, and had passed ten 
or more of the twelve items of the Stanford Hypnotizability 
Scale. Subjects were paid a dollar and one-half per hour. 
2. The Variable of Control: 
Verbat kecati Ab!llty 
In the first part of the experiment, each subject 
was given a printed page of the Ghost Story as presented by 
Bartlett (1932). They were instructed to read the story 
tWice at their regular speed so that they would be able 
later to recall the material as accurately as possible. 
This test was given in the attempt to control for the 
ability to recall. 
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The story was divided into units in the manner sug-
gested by Paul (1959) and scored according to the number 
- -
of units recalled correctly. The subjects were ranked 
according to their scores (see Appendix B, Table II) and 
- . -~ 
then divided into four groups in such a way that the first 
group consisted of the subjects ranked first through fourth, 
the second group consisted of those ranked fifth through 
eighth, and so on (see horizontal groups in Appendix B, 
-Table III) • This has been done in anticipation that each 
-group of subjects will be relatively more homogeneous on 
the dependent variable in absence of treatment effects than 
subjects selected completely at random. 
Three subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale, Information, Similarities, and Vocabulary, were 
also administered to the subjects in the first part of the 
experiment. This was done in order to obtain an estimate 
of their verbal intelligence, not as a variable of control, 
but as a possible correlate of the dependent variable (see 
estimated Verbal IQ, Appendix B, Table II). 
3. The Stimulus Variable: Cognitive 
Dissonance versus Consonance 
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The stimulus variable was introduced by means of a 
list of forty sentences half of which were dissonant and 
half consonant. In a dissonant sentence, the second part 
did not follow ~ogically from the first, or the stem. 
Consonant sentences consisted of two parts which were 
logically related. 
The list was derived in the following manner: 
seventy-five dissonant sentences, composed by the author, 
were presented to four judges, staff psychologists at the 
Massachusetts Mental Health Center. They were asked to 
pick the twenty sentences which best fit the above defini-
tion of dissonance. The twenty sentences selected as 
dissonant by three or more judges served as grammatical 
models for twenty consonant sentences also composed by the 
author. These resembled the dissonant sentences not only 
in grammatical form but also in apparent difficulty of 
words and in length. In order to increase the difficulty 
of detecting the principle of dissonance the randomization 
was restricted so that not more than two sentences of one 
kind followed each other (see Appendix A, Table I). 
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4. Methods of Presentation and Recall 
From pilot testing it was determined that one pre-
sentation with exposure time of seven seconds per sentence 
afforded two quick readings of each sentence without let-
ting the subject exercise effectively mnemonic devices to 
facilitate his recall. Ibe list was presented by means of 
a reading pacer. With a sheet attached to the bar to form 
a slot, only one sentence was uncovered at a time as the 
bar moved down the list at a set speed. 
Ibe recall period followed immediately after pre-
sentation. The subject was given a page on which the stems 
of the original sentences were printed in a new randomized 
order so as to prevent recall by spatial or temporal con-
tiguity. Ibe subjects were asked to complete in writing 
as many sentences as they could recall correctly. When 
they had finished, they were asked to guess on those 
sentences left uncompleted. 
5. The Dependent Variable: The Number 
of Recalled Sentences 
The dependent variable was the number of sentences 
recalled correctly. A separate score was computed for 
dissonant and consonant sentences. For scoring purposes, 
a sentence was regarded as correct when the subject re-
called the main idea, even if he made an e.:t:r or in a de-
tail. However, if this error occurred in a connecting 
word embodying the idea of dissonance, like ''however," 
"despite" and "but," the sentence was scored as wrong. 
The scoring was done by the author and another clinical 
psychologist after each sentence was discussed. 
6. The Independent Variable: Hxpnotic 
versus Normal State 
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The independent variable was the presence or ab-
sence of hypnosis during presentation of the test list or 
during the recall period. Four experimental conditions 
were chosen: 
(l) Presentation of list under hypnosis and its 
recall under hypnosis. If H stands for "hypnosis" and 
N for "normal state," this condition is represented in 
symbols as H-H. 
(2) Presentation under hypnosis and recall in the 
normal state (H-N). 
. -
(3) Presentation in the normal state and recall 
under hypnosis (N-H). 
-(4) Presentation and recall in the normal state 
(N-N). 
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Having already been divided into four groups accord-
ing to their rank on the scoring of the Ghost Story, sub-
jects were assigned to the four experimental conditions in 
such a way that members of each of the four groups were 
assigned by means of random tables to the four treatments. 
The vertical groupings in Appendix B, Table Ill, show the 
assignments by conditions. 
Hypnosis was induced in the following manner: 
After it was established in the session that the subject 
had been hypnotized before so that he knew that no harm 
would befall him and that be would not be exposed to 
ridicule of any sort, the subject was told to relax all 
the muscles of his body, and it was suggested that all his 
limbs would become heavier and heavier. The suggestions 
were given in a monotonous voice with slight variations, 
as suggested by Weitzenhoffer and Hilgard (1959) in the 
. 
Stanford Hypnotic Suggestibility Scale. When the subject 
closed his eyes, hand catalepsy was established and the 
subject was instructed to open his eyes and still remain 
in trance. Seeing his hand in the rigid position helps 
the subject to remain in trance with open eyes. After the 
suggestion to relax his hand, the subject was given the 
test. The hypnotic induction took about ten minutes. 
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After the presentation and recall of the test, 
each subject gave his view of the purpose of the experiment 
and was asked whether a hypnotized person would react dif-
ferently to the test than a person in the normal state. 
7. Srmnary of Procedure 
Sixteen good hypnotic subjects were given a memory 
test to determine their ability to recall. On the basis 
of their scores, they were divided into four groups. They 
were also given three subtests of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale to obtain an estimate of their verbal 
intelligence. In the experiment proper they were given a 
test list of twenty dissonant and twenty consonant 
sentences. each sentence presented for seven seconds by 
means of a reading pacer. Recall was tested immediately 
by asking the subjects to complete a re-randomized list 
of the stems of the original sentences. The presentation 
and the recall were done under one of four conditions to 
which the subjects within each group were assigned at 
random. These conditions were: (1) H-H, (2) H-N, 
(3) N-H, and (4) N-N. After the test, the subjects gave 
their opinions about the purpose of the experiment and 
about the possible difference in recall between hypnotized 
subjects and persons in the normal state. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
A. The Experimental Hypotheses 
The two statistical hypotheses that have been 
tested experimentally are stated as follows: 
l. Test hYJ?othesis: The mean number of correctly 
recalled dissonant sentences exposed under hypnosis is 
equal to the mean number of correctly recalled dissonant 
sentences exposed in the normal state. 
Alternative hYpothesis: The mean number of 
correctly recalled dissonant sentences exposed under hyp-
nosis is significantly higher than the mean number of cor-
rectly recalled dissonant sentences exposed in the normal 
state. 
2. Test hmthesis: The mean number of correctly 
recalled dissonant sentences exposed in the normal state 
and recalled under hypnosis is equal to the mean number of 
correctly recalled dissonant sentences exposed and recalled 
in the normal state. 
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Alternative hypothesis: The mean number of 
correctly recalled dissonent sentences exposed in the 
normal state and recalled under hypnosis is significantly 
higher than the mean number of correctly recalled dis-
sonant sentences exposed and recalled in the normal state. 
B. Experimental Results 
Two analyses of variance were performed. For the 
first hypothesis, an analysis of variance for randomized 
blocks design, with replications, was carried out accord-
ing to McNemar (1960). This involved the four experimental 
-
conditions grouped according to presence or absence of 
hypnosis during exposure, namely, H-H plus H-N versus N-H 
plus N-N. With two conditions of exposure, two replica-
tions per exposure, and four blocks, there were altogether 
16 pieces of data. The raw data are presented in Appendix 
C, Table IV, the means foX' each of the four conditions in 
Table I, and the analysis of variance in Table II. 
The mean for hypnotic exposure (H-H plus H-N) is 
-
8.87, and the mean for normal exposure (N-H plus N-N is 
-5.12. A general statement can be made about the data. 
More cognitively dissonant sentences are correctly recalled 
when they are exposed under hypnosis, than when they are 
exposed in the normal state. 
'tABLE I 
THE MEAN NUMBEBS OF CORRECTLY RECALLED 
DISSONANT SEN'lB!a:S UNDER THE FOUR 
EXPERIMEN'lAL CONDITIONS 
Condition H•H H-N N-H 
Mean 9 8.75 5.5 
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N-N 
4.75 
Source 
Total 
TABU: II 
ANALYSIS OF VARI.AN:!E FOR CORRECTLY RECALLED 
DISSONANT .SENTENCES 
ss d.£. M.S. F 
248 15 
Conditions (C) 56.25 1 56.25 11.8* 
~ ~ ~ 
Blocks (B) 43.5 3 14.5 3.05 
. . 
CxB 14.25 3 4.75 
Within 134 8 17.25 
* p •• 05 
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Since the mean number of correctly recalled sen-
tences exposed under hypnosis is significantly higher 
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(F • 11.8, p • .05) than the mean number of correctly re-
- -
called dissonant sentences exposed in the normal state, 
the first hypothesis of no difference between such means 
is rejected. 
For the second hypothesis, an analysis of variance 
for two randomized blocks design was done (Edwards, 1960). 
-This involved conditions N-H and N-N, and with four 
blocks there were altogether 8 pieces of data. The raw 
data are presented in Appendix C, Table IV, under the ap-
propriate two conditions, and the analysis of variance is 
shown in Table III. 
The mean for condition N-H is 5.5 and the mean for 
condition N-N is 4.75. Since the mean number of correctly 
recalled dissonant sentences exposed in the normal state 
and recalled under hypnosis is not significantly higher 
(F < 1) than the mean number of correctly recalled dissonant 
sentences exposed and recalled in the normal state, the 
second test hypothesis of no difference between such means 
is retained. 
It can be generally stated that if hypnosis is in-
duced during recall period of cognitively dissonant 
sentences that were exposed in the normal state, it does 
Source 
Total 
TABLE III 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR CORRECTLY RECALLED 
DISSONANT SENTENCES 
(CONDITIONS N•H AND N•N) 
ss d.£. M.S. F 
68.9 7 
Conditions (C) 1.15 1 1.15 <1 
- -
Blocks (B) 30.4 3 10.1 <1 
- -
CxB 37.35 3 12.45 
44 
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not affect their recall. 
C. Additional Analyses related to the First Hypothesis 
In order to narrow down the number of alternative 
psychological interpretations that can be made with re-
spect to the first hypothesis and its confirmation, addi-
tional analyses were performed. 
It has been observed by White et al. (1940) and 
-
by Rosenthal (1944) that recall of meaningful connected 
- -
material is improving under hypnosis. In these two 
studies the meaningful material was learned in the 
normal state and recalled under hypnosis. The authors 
interpreted the improvement in recall under hypnosis as 
due to the effects of relaxation and freedom from anxiety 
that facilitate the reconstructive process of remembering. 
Two claims may be made on the basis of these find-
ings and interpretations. One, based on the findings 
alone, is that it is conceivable that hypermnesia may 
occur in the hypnotic state regardless of the temporal 
point at which hypnosis interferes, i.e. at exposure or 
at recall. Another claim, based on the "relaxation" in-
terpretation, may be that the relaxing effects of hypnosis 
induced during exposure are still in force during recall 
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which follows exposure in:mediately. The two claims lead to 
the identical conclusion that consonant material should be 
recalled better when exposed under hypnosis than when ex-
posed in the normal state. This statement can be formu-
lated as a hypothesis: 
Test hypothesis: The mean number of consonant 
sentences exposed under hypnosis is equal to the mean num-
ber of correctly recalled consonant sentences exposed in 
the normal state. 
Alternative hypothesis: The mean number of cor-
rectly recalled consonant sentences exposed under hypnosis 
is significantly higher than the mean number of consonant 
sentences exposed in the normal state. 
An analysis of variance for randomized blocks 
design, with replications, was performed on the data of 
consonant sentences. The raw data appear in Appendix C, 
Table V, the mean numbers of correctly recalled consonant 
sentences under each of the four experimental conditions 
are shown in Table IV, and the analysis of variance is 
shown in Table V. 
The mean number of correctly recalled consonant 
sentences for hypnotic exposure (H-H plus H-N) is 13.375, 
" 
and the mean number of correctly recalled consonant sen-
tences for normal exposure (N·H plus N•N) is ll.75. Since 
TABLE IV· 
THE MEAN NUMBERS OF CORRECTLY RECALLED CONSONANT 
SENTENCES UNDER EACH OF THE FOUR 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
Condition H·H H-N N-H N-N 
Mean 14.75 12 11 12.5 
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Source 
Total 
'WLEV 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR CORRECTLY RECALLED 
CONSONANT SENTENCES 
ss d. f. M.S. F 
-
226 15 
Conditions (C) 12.25 1 12.25 <1 
- -
Blocks (B) 66.5 3 22.2 <1 
- -CxB 110.25 3 36.75 8.4* 
-
Within 35 8 4.375 
* _P : .01 
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the mean number of correctly recalled consonant sentences 
exposed under hypnosis is not significantly different 
(F < l) from the mean number of correctly recalled con-
sonant sentences exposed in the normal state, the test 
hypothesis of no difference between such means cannot be 
rejected. 
It can be generally stated that consonant sentences 
presented under hypnosis are not recalled better than con-
sonant sentences presented in the normal state. 
The analysis of variance shows a significant 
(p = .Ol) interaction effect between conditions and blocks. 
- -To make a visual presentation of the data, Figure I has 
been graphed; numerical form is presented in Appendix C • 
Table VI. Figure I indicates that subjects in block l 
(poorest recall ability) and block 4 (best recall ability) 
~ - ,... ... 
have better recall for material exposed under hypnosis than 
subjects in blocks 2 and 3. On the other hand, subjects in 
blocks 2, 3, and 4, recall better material presented in the 
normal state than subjects in block l. In comparing the 
two conditions, it appears that subjects in block l recall 
material presented under hypnosis better than subjects to 
whom the material is presented in their normal state, while 
the reverse occurs in block 2. In block 3 this reversed 
effect seems much reduced, and in block 4 there appears 
FIGUBE I 
'l'HE MEANS OF CORRECTLY RECALlED CONSONANT 
SENTENCES EXPOSED UNDER HYPNOSIS OR IN 
'l'HE NORMAL STA'l'E FOR EACH OF 'l'HE 
PRE·BXPER.IMENTAL .RECALL GROUPS 
H 
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4 
again some gain in recall when the consonant material is 
presented under hypnosis. 
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It may be argued that intelligence is a factor in 
better recall of dissonant material, because more intelli-
gent people may be expected to make sense of dissonant 
material more quickly by appropriate supplying of an 
intervening link. Correlations between scores on the 
dissonant material and estimated verbal intelligence are 
presented in Table VI. (IQ values for each subject are 
shown in Appendix B, Table II) • The correlations are not 
. 
significant except for one condition where the relation-
ship is in the opposite direction, and the correlations 
are not significant for the combined conditions H-H plus 
H-N or N-H plus N-N. When conditions are ignored and 
overall correlation is made, rho • -.11, which is a 
statistically insignificant value. It may be said that 
for this group of subjects the data do not support the 
argument that verbal intelligence facilitates recall of 
dissonant material. 
D. Further Analyses 
It has been proposed in the theoretical section 
that dissonant material tends both to be forgotten and to 
TABLE VI 
SPEABMAN CORRELATIONS BE'l'WEEN ''DISSONANT'' 
SCORES Am IQ VALUES 
H•H rs -.50 p ~ .05 
H-N rs -.96 p = .05 
N-H rs .50 p ' .05 
N•N rs -.83 p ' .05 
H-H &H-N rs -.20 p < .05 
N-H &N•N rs -.20 p ( .05 
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be distorted more than consonant material. The n\DDber of 
correctly recalled consonant and dissonant sentences was 
therefore compared for each condition and for the total 
experimental group. The raw data appear in Appendix D, 
Table VII, and the t values and their probabilities are 
shown in Table VII. It appears that under all conditions 
significantly more consonant than dissonant sentences are 
recalled correctly. (p varies between .05 and~ .005). 
-
A related question may be asked about the direc-
tion of distortion. There are four possible directions: 
a dissonant sentence can be distorted in the direction of 
consonance or in the direction of another dissonance; a 
consonant sentence can be distorted in the direction of 
another consonance or in the direction of dissonance. A 
distinction was made between faulty spontaneous recall and 
distorted guesses because the experimenter urged subjects 
to guess on the items for which they claimed no recall. 
The direction of distortion is presented in Appendix D, 
Table VIII, and the direction in terms of percentages is 
shown in Table VIII. It can be seen that about fifty per 
cent of the distortions, whether in recall or in guessing, 
are directed from dissonance to consonance, and the next 
most common distortion proceeds from consonance to another 
consonance. This is true regardless of experimental con-
ditions. 
TABLE VII 
COMPARISON OF "DISSONANT'' AND "CONSONANT'' 
SCORES FOR EACH AND ALL CONDITIOO'S 
(t VALUES AND PROBABILITIES) 
Condition t value p 
H-H 3.107 .05 :> 
H-N 2.475 .05 > 
N-H 5.748 
N-N 3.175 .05 > 
All 
Conditions 4.215 
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<.025 
<.025 
>.005 
<.025 
> .005 
TABLE VIII 
DIS TORT ION IN TERMS OF PER CENT OF SENTENCES 
DISTORTED IN EACH DIRECTION AND 
EACH CONDITION 
Direction of Distortion 
Condition 
C-D c-c 
r 
H-H 7 
H-N 9 
N-H 20 
N-N 4 
All 
Groups 10 
All 
~roups 
Sum 
r&g) 
-
C -- Consonant 
D -- Dissonant 
g r 
14 30 
7 27 
14 20 
15 25 
15 25 
12 
f -- distorted recall 
g -- distorted guess 
* Rounding errors. 
g 
10 
35 
27 
20 
23 
23 
D-e D-D 
r g r g 
50 66 14 10 
54 57 9 3 
33 46 27 13 
66 53 4 10 
50 55 14 9 
53 10 
SUM 
r 
101* 
' 
99 
100 
99 
99 
98 
55 
g 
100 
102 
100 
98 
102 
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E. The Post-Experimental Interview 
All subjects responded essentially in the same way 
to the inquiry about the purpose of the experiment, They 
observed that it had to do with memory, and noted that some 
sentences were logical and some not, but no distinction 
was made between the two types of sentences in relation to 
the purpose of the experiment. All but one believed that 
hypnotized persons should recall more sentences because of 
better concentration. One subject (S.A.) felt that hypno-
~ "' 
tized subjects should recall dissonant sentences better 
than consonant sentences. He could not explain why this 
should be the case. He, as the others, recalled more 
consonant than dissonant sentences. 
F. SUIIIIlary of the Findings 
The findings may be sn•1111arized as follows: 
1. Dissonant sentences are recalled better when 
exposed under hypnosis than in the normal state. 
2. Dissonant sentences are not recalled better 
when recalled under hypnosis than in the normal state. 
3. Consonant sentences are not recalled better 
when exposed under hypnosis than in the normal state. 
4. No correlation was found between recall of 
dissonant material and verbal intelligence. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
This study has established that under certain cir-
cumstances hypnosis has an apparent facilitating effect on 
recall of cognitively dissonant material. Also, it has 
narrowed down the number of possible interpretations of 
the observed effect. 
In order for the hypnotic intervention to be ef-
fective, it must be present at the time of exposure. 
When hypnosis takes place during recall period only, it 
has no noticeable facilitating effect on the recall of 
cognitively dissonant material. 
A possible interpretation of the better recall of 
dissonant material exposed under hypnosis may be based 
indirectly on the explanation suggested by White et al. 
(1940) and by Rosenthal (1944) to account for their find-
-
ing of hypermnesia under hypnosis for connected material. 
Their explanation is in terms of relaxation, freedom from 
anxiety, and l~k of ego involvement. Because of this 
emotional tranquility, the reconstructive memory process, 
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as suggested by Bartlett (1932) is less hampered in hyp-
nosis than in the normal state. The explanation in terms 
of lack of ego involvement is similar to the interpreta-
tion offered by Rosenzweig (1938) for the absence of the 
Zeigarnik effect in task-oriented subjects. It should be 
pointed out that White and his co-workers and Rosenthal 
found hypermnesia for material learned in the normal state 
and recalled under hypnosis. However, it may be claimed 
that in the case of immediate recall the effect of hypno-
sis during exposure still operates during recall. 
The results with respect to consonant material in 
the test list show, however, that consonant sentences are 
not recalled better when exposed under hypnosis than when 
exposed in the normal state. This is the case when the 
effect on recall is averaged over the blocks representing 
different levels of retentive ability. Thus it would 
seem on the basis of the data that the relaxation hypothesis 
is not sufficient to account for the better recall of ma-
terial presented under hypnosis. 
It should be noted that when each block is examined 
separately, it appears that subjects with relatively poor 
ability as well as subjects with relatively good ability 
do recall consonant material exposed under hypnosis better 
than subjects with similar ability who were exposed to the 
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material in their normal state. On the other hand, sub-
jects in the middle two groups do better when the con-
sonant material is presented to them in their normal state. 
No explanation has been found to account for this differ-
ential effect. 
One interpretation of the better recall of dis-
sonant sentences exposed under hypnosis may be that the 
results have nothing to do with hypnosis, but with the 
intelligence of the subjects. It may be claimed that 
intelligent persons have available to them a wealth of 
associations from which to supply a link between the two 
dissonant elements so as to make a meaningful integration 
of the sentence, which will then be recalled more easily. 
The absence of significant correlations (except for one 
-
in a negative direction) between the subjects' estimated 
-
verbal IQ and their recall scores for dissonant material 
seems to speak against such interpretation. It should be 
stressed that in view of the small size of the groups 
that served as basis for the correlations, no generaliza-
tion is made about the relationship between intelligence 
and the recall of dissonant material. 
An interpretation which appears to take account of 
both the positive and negative results with respect to the 
two predictions is proposed in accordance with the 
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theoretical formulations stated above: In the normal 
state, when a piece of information is encountered, which 
cannot be fitted by the cognitive processes into existing 
knowledge, it is handled in one of two ways: it may be 
ignored, or it may be distorted so as to fit known experi-
ence. 
If it is assumed that cognitive organizing princi-
ple• function from the point of the encounter with the 
stimulus, the question may arise: at what point in the 
cognitive process does the elimination (avoiding) and/or 
-
the distortion take place? It may take place very 
shortly after exposure, or the deliberative and judging 
process may take longer before the dissonant material is 
declared, so to speak, to be "dissonant" and is handled 
accordingly. This may depend upon several factors, such 
as the degree of dissonance, the importance of such 
dissonance to the person in terms of his involvement with 
the issue, and the time allowed for exposure and reflection. 
It has been proposed that in the hypnotic state a 
partial suspension of rational processes takes place. Be-
cause of this partial suspension, dissonant material is 
not cognized as "dissonant" to the same degree that it is 
when rational processes function without decrement, and it 
therefore is less likely to undergo elimination and/or 
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distortion. 
Since it could not be determined beforehand how 
fast judgement is passed on the dissonance of the material, 
two points in time were chosen for the intervention of 
hypnosis--at exposure and at recall. 
The results appear to show that if the partial 
suspension of the everyday cognitive processes takes place 
at exposure, the dissonant material is not yet cognized as 
"dissonant" and so it is "registered" as an experience. At 
least during the short interval until recall is r~quested 
(from six to ten minutes in this study) the experience 
" ' 
seems to be available, since it is recalled. However, 
when the partial suspension takes place at the point of 
recall, it does not seem to have any effect on the dis-
sonant material: the experience does not seem to be 
available to a greater degree than when the recall takes 
place in the normal state. The last statement should be 
qualified in view of the small size of the groups that have 
been compared. A related point should be mentioned here: 
in view of the lack of significant difference between the 
means of correctly recalled dissonant sentences exposed 
in the normal state but recalled under hypnosis versus 
those that were both exposed and recalled in the normal 
state, t!bis finding may be interpreted as a disconfirming 
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evidence against hyperma.esia under hypnosis. Besides the 
smallness of the size of the groups compared, there are 
several differences between the type of material and 
methods of presentation and recall in this study and in 
the studies by White and co-workers and Rosenthal. In 
their case the material was meaningful poetry; the mater-
ial was learned to a criterion of perfect repetitions; the 
recall was twenty-four hours later. It is suggested there-
fore that the present results leading to rejection of the 
second prediction should not be regarded as bearing on the 
question of hypermnesia under recall of different mater-
ials and different procedures. 
With respect to the first hypothesis, it may be 
concluded that in the normal state cognizing of dissonant 
material takes place at exposure or immediately after with 
the resulting operation of the eliminating and distorting 
processes. When the cognizing is arrested, in the hyp-
notic state, at the point of exposure, the experience of 
dissonance is 11registered. 11 Once registered, it is avail-
able, at least for a short period. 
The conclusions should be strongly qualified: The 
suspension of the rational processes that may have taken 
place is very slight. Material exposed under hypnosis is 
indeed recalled significantly better than if it is exposed 
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in the normal state, but inspection of the data shows that 
on the whole many dissonant sentences were forgotten or 
distorted. Also, even under hypnosis the most frequent 
direction of distortion was toward consonance. It is also 
possible that short exposure time, and the large number of 
sentences in the test list, are factors in the fast "judge-
ment" that takes place in the beginning of the continuum of 
exposure-recall. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Further investigation is suggested along several 
dimensions. 
The relatively better recall of dissonant material 
exposed under hypnosis has been obtained for material pre-
sented in light hypnosis. It may be expected that in 
deeper hypnosis there is greater suspension of rational 
processes and consequently more "registration" of dissonant 
material with resultant better recall for such material. 
However, the clinical observations and the theoretical 
considerations of Gill and Brenman (1959) and Shor (1959) 
suggest increasing intrusion of "primary'' material and 
functioning. Such functioning may interfere with the re-
call of any material. It appears worthwhile to investigate 
the interaction between the processes that facilitate and 
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inhibit correct recall of material exposed in the various 
levels of hypnosis. The amount of correctly recalled dis-
sonant sentences may be one index of such interaction. 
Ackman's (1960) measures of "primary'' manifestations in 
Rorschach responses may be added to supply a more direct 
index of the intrusion of "primary" material. 
Another line of investigation has to do with the 
forgetting of dissonant material along a temporal dimen-
sion. It may be argued that since material exposed under 
hypnosis is relatively better "registered," it is for-
gotten at a slower rate than material exposed in the 
normal state. It may however be argued that the function-
ing of normal cognitive processes, reinstated at termina-
tion of hypnosis, is speeded-up to eliminate the effects 
of "registration," so that the curve of forgetting of 
dissonant material exposed under hypnosis is steeper than 
that of forgetting material exposed in the normal state. 
A somewhat related problem is the learning of the 
material. Learning to criterion involves memorization, 
and besides, it may be expected that partial suspension 
of the rational processes enhances learning since "regis-
tration" is better. It may then be expected that under 
hypnosis less trials are needed to reach a certain cri-
terion than in the normal state. Using learning to 
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criterion instead of the short exposure time given in this 
study may enable the experimenter that investigates the 
former problem to select further temporal points of recall. 
As for the units of measurement of recall of 
dissonant material, it is suggested that greater sensitivity 
may be gained if the amount of dissonance is taken as a 
unit instead of the number of sentences. The dissonant 
sentences may be given to judges to rate according to the 
magnitude of dissonance that exists between the two parts 
of each sentence. 
In this study an attempt has been made in con-
structing the sentences to keep to a minimum the affective 
tone of the material in order to reduce confounding ef-
fects of repressive devices. Another approach to study 
the effects of hypnosis on some cognitive functions by 
means of material which is minimally charged with emotions 
may be taken. We refer to several of the tests used for 
example by Gardner et al. (1959), like the Schematizing 
Test and the Kinesthetic Time Error Test. The rationale 
for studying cognitive controls by means of such psycho-
physical measures is provided by these writers. It is 
also suggested that the whole range of cognitive controls 
may be usefully investigated under hypnosis to determine 
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whether there are changes along each dimension of control, 
and whether there are stylistic re-patternings of controls 
in the hypnotic state. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of the study has been to explore cer-
tain cognitive processes as they operate in the hypnotic 
state. More specifically, it was to investigate the in-
fluence of hypnosis on the recall of verbal material cog-
nitively dissonant in nature. Cognitive dissonance oc-
curs when one element of cognition does not follow from 
the other. 
On the basis of the literature on hypnosis, 
especially from the writings of Gill and Brenman (1959) 
and Shor (1959), and the findings of Orne (1959) concern-
~ ~ ~ -
ing the suspension of rational thinking in the hypnotic 
state, two predictions were made: 
1. Cognitively dissonant material exposed under 
hypnosis is recalled better than cognitively dissonant 
material exposed in the normal state. 
2. Cognitively dissonant material exposed in the 
normal state is recalled better under hypnosis than when 
it is both exposed and recalled in the normal state. 
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The subjects were sixteen undergraduate students, 
nine females and seven males, from 22 to 27 years of age, 
with the median at 23. In several screenings they had 
passed from ten to twelve of the Stanford hypnotizability 
tests and were classified as good hypnotic subjects. 
They were divided into four groups of four according to 
their scores on a pretest of verbal recall ability. 
Estimates of verbal intelligence were also obtained. 
Later, the subjects within each group were randomly as-
signed to one of four experimental conditions: (1) both 
exposure and recall under hypnosis; (2) exposure under 
hypnosis and recall in the normal state; (3) exposure in 
-
the normal state and recall under hypnosis; and (4) both 
exposure and recall in the normal state. 
The material to be recalled was a randomized list 
of forty sentences, half of which were consonant, and the 
other half, dissonant. The material was presented by 
means of a reading pacer in such a way that each sentence 
was exposed separately for seven seconds. Recall was 
measured immediately afterward by means of a written com-
pletion test in which the first half of each of the forty 
sentences, in re-randomized order, was given. The sub-
jects were told to guess on those sentences they could not 
recall. 
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Analyses of variance for randomized blocks design, 
with and without replications, and several correlations 
were performed on the data. 
The results confirmed the first prediction that 
dissonant material is recalled better when exposed under 
hypnosis, than when exposed in the normal state. However, 
the results did not confirm the second prediction that 
dissonant material recalled under hypnosis, when exposed 
in the normal state, is remembered better than dissonant 
material exposed and recalled in the normal state. 
Several additional findings were reported: sig-
nificantly more consonant than dissonant sentences were 
recalled under all conditions; most instances of distor-
tion were in the direction of consonance; no significant 
correlation was found between level of verbal intelligence 
and recall of dissonant material. 
On the basis of the results and the theoretical 
formulations, the following conclusions have been reached: 
1. When dissonant material is presented to a 
person in the normal state, and when tlb.is material cannot 
be integrated with previous experience, the rational 
processes function so as to eliminate the material or to 
distort it in such a way that it fits with existing knowl-
edge. 
71 
2. When dissonant material is presented to a 
person in the hypnotic state, due to partial suspension of 
the rational processes, the material is not cognized as 
"dissonant" to the same degree as in the normal state, and 
therefore it "registers" and is available at time of re-
call. 
3. It follows from these two conclusions that if 
the dissonant material is presented in the normal state 
it does not register during exposure and so is not avail-
able at recall, even in recall under hypnosis when there 
is a partial suspension of the rational processes. 
APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A 
'!'HE TEST LIS 'r 
TABLE I 
'l'HE TEST LIST 
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(D)* He expressed his wish clearly, so that almost every-
one could ignore him. 
(C)* Unable to disguise his dissatisfaction, he decided 
to leave the room. 
(C) It is not that we have another plan, but yours needs 
a complete revision. 
(D) I like this story very much, despite the fact that 
it appeals to me. 
(D) The actors were ready to start, long after the curtain 
went up. 
(C) Granted that the odds are against us, we still have 
a fighting chance. 
(C) After a leisurely walk in the garden, he returned for 
his usual drink. 
(D) Following a heated discussion, a long argument pre-
ceded. 
(D) Unable to stay longer at the party, he was standing 
near the table. 
(C) Supposing your view is correct, would you really 
act upon it? 
* C--consonant; D--dissonant. 
75 
~LE !--continued 
(C) As he will not hesitate to do it, you may certainly 
ask for his help. 
(D) George did not care for the movies, so he arrived 
late for lunch. 
(D) As no sound was heard, the picture was left on the 
chair. 
(C) Following his footsteps quietly, she imitated his 
unusual gait. 
(C) Since it sounds like a good idea, I really feel it 
deserves a try. 
(D) He did not budge an inch; on the contrary, he re-
fused to admit his mistake. 
(C) Without coming to a quick decision, I tend to favor 
your position. 
(D) Unless you make up your mind, you will decide what 
to do about the matter. 
(C) Although we asked him to remain, he had to leave 
right away. 
(C) The way to the village was muddy; in fact it was 
almost impassable. 
(D) After an exhaustive drive, he appreciated the new 
paintings she got. 
(C) My brother went out for a minute, because he wanted 
to buy cigarettes. 
~LE !--continued 
(C) The driver has neither dimned his lights, nor has 
he reduced the speed of the car. 
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(D) This upset all our plans for the party; nevertheless 
we postponed it for several days. 
(C) The little dog did not run away; on the contrary, 
it bravely approached the gate. 
(D) All the children have already gone to bed, so that 
the buses ran on schedule. 
(D) Although the boat was moving slowly, they settled 
down for a card-game. 
(C) As no agreement was reached, they let the matter 
drop for a while. 
(D) Instead of going to the store, at eight o'clock 
the concert has started. 
(D) Without heeding your advice, I believe I can count 
upon it. 
(C) She slammed the door, so all knew she was quite 
upset. 
(C) The ~ority has already voted, so they were sure 
who would be elected. 
(D) Supposing he is sick, will he be early for dinner? 
(D) He was quite tired this day, so he went for his 
weekly hair-cut. 
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TABLE !--continued 
(C) As it was a warm afternoon, he took off his coat and 
felt better. 
(D) Despite his liking for his present job, he also 
joined the club. 
(C) The train left on schedule; nevertheless it took a 
long time before it left. 
(D) Since be was in a rush, he paid as usual some atten· 
tion to the street lights. 
(D) I have nothing to say about the matter; so I'll tell 
you my own viewpoint. 
(C) Jack liked the new show so much, that be stayed for 
a second performance. 
APPENDIX B 
RANKING AND ASSIGNMENT OF SUBJECTS 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
TABLE II 
SUBJECTS RANKED ACCORDING TO SCORES ON 
GHOST STORY AND IQ VALUES BASED ON 
SCORES ON THREE WAIS SUBTESTS 
Ghost Ghost 
Subjects Story IQ Rank Subjects Story 
Scores Scores 
R.T. 23 134 9 A.B. 49 
J.R. 26 136 10 e.G. 51 
J.M. 31 106 11 P.P. 52 
S.D. 37 136 12 c.c. 53 
P.G. 38 130 13 G.H. 55 
S.A. 40 141 14 D.A. 58 
J.L 46 128 15 L.C. 63 
R.M. 47 134 16 N.B. 65 
79 
IQ 
142 
132 
124 
142 
140 
146 
124 
150 
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TABLE III 
ASSIGNMENT OF SUBJECTS TO BLOCKS AND CONDITIONS 
. 
Conditions 
Blocks 
H-H H-N N-H N-N 
1 J.M. S.D. R.T. J .R. 
2 P.G. s.A. R.M. J .L. 
3 e.G. P.P. A.B. c.c. 
4 D.A. L.C. N.B. G.H 
APPENDIX C 
RAW DATA 
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TABU: IV 
CORRECTLY RECALLED DISSONANT SENTENCES 
Conditions 
Blocks 
H-H H-N N-H N-N 
1 4 11 1 4 
2 10 5 5 9 
3 13 4 6 2 
4 9 15 10 4 
Sum 36 35 22 19 
Mean 9 8.75 5.5 4.75 
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TABLEV 
CORRECTLY RECALLED CONSONANT SENTENCES 
Conditions 
Blocks 
H-H H-N N-H N-N 
l 16 13 4 5 
2 13 8 12 17 
3 13 ll 13 15 
4 17 16 15 13 
Sum 59 48 44 50 
Mean 14.75 12 ll 12.5 
TABLE VI 
THE MEANS OF CORRECTLY RECALLED CONSONANT SENTENCES 
EXPOSED UNDER HYPNOSIS OR IN THE NORMAL STATE 
FOR EACH OF THE PRE-EXPERIMENTAL 
RECALL GROUPS 
Condition at Pre~erimental Recall Grouns 
Exposure 1 2 3 4 
H 14.5 10.5 12 16.5 
N 4.5 14.5 14 14 
Al'PENDIXD 
MEANS AND COMPARISONS 
Subjects 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
TABLE VII 
COMPARISON OF "DISSONANT'' AND "CONSONANT" 
SCORES FOR EACH AND ALL CONDITIONS 
H-H N-H 
Consonant Dissonant Subjects Consonant 
16 4 9 4 
13 10 10 12 
13 13 11 13 
17 9 12 15 
H-N N-N 
13 11 13 5 
8 5 14 17 
11 4 15 15 
16 15 16 13 
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Dissonant 
1 
5 
6 
10 
4 
9 
2 
4 
TABLE VIII 
DIRECTION OF DISTORTION IN TERMS OF 
NUMBER OF SENTENCES DISTORTED IN 
EACH DIRECTION AND CONDITION 
Condition 
C-D 
r g 
H-H 1 6 
H-N 3 3 
N-H 6 8 
H-N 1 10 
All 
Groups ll 27 
All 
Groups (Sum 
r&g) 38 
c--Consonant 
D--Dissonant 
r--distorted recall 
g--distorted guess 
Direction of Distortion 
c-c D-e D-D 
r g r g r g 
4 4 7 28 2 4 
9 15 18 25 3 1 
6 15 10 26 8 7 
6 14 16 36 1 7 
25 48 51 ll5 14 19 
73 166 33 
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SUM 
r g 
14 42 
33 44 
30 56 
24 67 
101 209 
310 
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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the study has been to explore cer-
tain cognitive processes as they operate in the hypnotic 
state. More specifically, it was to investigate the in-
fluence of hypnosis on the recall of verbal material cog-
nitively dissonant in nature. Cognitive dissonance oc-
curs when one element of cognition does not follow from 
the other. 
On the basis of the literature on hypnosis, 
especially from the writings of Gill and Brenman (1959) 
and Shor (1959), and the findings of Orne (1959) concern-
ing the suspension of rational thinking in the hypnotic 
state, two predictions were made: 
1. Cognitively dissonant material exposed under 
hypnosis is recalled better than cognitively dissonant 
material exposed in the normal state. 
2. Cognitively dissonant material exposed in the 
normal state is recalled better under hypnosis than when 
it is both exposed and recalled in the normal state. 
The subjects were sixteen undergraduate students, 
nine females and seven males, from 22 to 27 years of age, 
with the median at 23. In several screenings they had 
95 
passed from ten to twelve of the Stanford hypnotizability 
tests and were classified as good hypnotic subjects. 
Th.s:y were divided into four groups of four according to 
their scores on a pretest of verbal recall ability. They 
were also given three subtests of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale: Information, Similarities, and 
Vocabulary. Later, the subjects within each group were 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: 
(1) both exposure and recall under hypnosis; (2) exposure 
-
under hypnosis and recall in the normal state; (3) ex-
posure in the normal state and recall under hypnosis; and 
(4) both exposure and recall in the normal state. 
The material to be recalled was a randomized list 
of forty sentences, half of which were regular, or con-
sonant, and the other half, dissonant sentences. The 
material was presented by means of a reading pacer in such 
a way that each sentence was exposed separately for seven 
seconds. Recall was measured immediately afterwards by 
means of a written completion test in which the first 
half of each of the forty sentences, in re-randomized 
order, was given. The subjects were told to guess on 
those sentences they could not recall. 
Analyses of variance for randomized blocks design, 
with and without replications and several correlations 
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were performed on the data. 
The results confirmed the first prediction that 
dissonant material is recalled better when exposed under 
hypnosis, than when exposed in the normal state. How-
ever, the results did not confirm the second prediction 
that dissonant material recalled under hypnosis, when ex-
posed in the normal state, is remembered better than dis-
sonant material exposed and recalled in the normal state. 
Several additional findings were reported: sig-
nificantly more consonant than dissonant sentences were 
recalled under all conditions; most instances of dis-
tortion were in the direction of consonance; no signifi-
cant correlation was found between level of verbal 
intelligence and recall of dissonant material. 
On the basis of the results and the theoretical 
formulations, the following conclusions have been reached: 
1. When dissonant material is presented to a 
person in the normal state, and when this material is not 
integrated with previous experience, the rational processes 
function so as to eliminate the material or to distort it 
in such a way that it fits with existing knowledge. 
2. When dissonant material is presented to a 
person in the hypnotic state, due to partial suspension 
of the rational processes, the material is not cognized 
97 
as "dissonant" to the same degree as in the normal state, 
and therefore it "registers" and is available for recall. 
3. It follows from these two conclusions that if 
the dissonant material is presented in the normal state, 
it does not register during exposure and so is not avail-
able at recall, even in recall under hypnosis when there 
is a partial suspension of the rational processes during 
recall. 
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